, but the ruling in
Chevron created a test aimed to reduce ambiguity in the law. This test, also known as the Chevron two-step, is:
1-Has "Congress . . . directly spoken to the precise question at issue,"
2-Is the agencies interpretation of the statute "permissible."
2
The Chevron two-step aimed to harmonize agency adjudication by creating a simple rule that first confirms that the governing statute does not explicitly state anything contrary to the agencies action, and second that the interpretation of the statute by the agency is "permissible". While rule 1 is arguably just a special case of rule 2 (Stephenson and Vermeule 2009) it remains that the Chevron two-step implies a large degree of agency deference.
1.B Selection and Incentives
Measuring the effect of a legal change is by no means a straight forward process.
The incentives to both potential challengers and agencies will likely be affected by the 1 467 US 837 (1984) . 2 Id. at passing of Chevron. Litigation strategies by both parties will likely alter creating a nonrandom sample of cases pre-and post-Chevron. This is evidenced by the fact that prior to Chevron, the degree to which judges deferred to agency decisions varied greatly by judge and case (Miles & Sunstein 2006) . The ambiguity in the expectation of judicial agency deference was surely calculated in a challenger's decision to challenge (Manning & Stephenson 2009) . 3 This same ambiguous threat of litigation would likely affect how agencies operate.
From the viewpoint of the challenger, it is unclear a priori whether ambiguous expected outcomes would create an incentive to challenge more or less often. In one scenario, the challenger might be more inclined to challenge (compared to a postChevron world) due to private information held that signals to the strength of the case.
On the other hand, if there is no clear rubric in agency adjudication, a would-be challenger would likely not be able to accurately calculate the probability of success, and this might discourage challenging. The same ambiguity would likely affect how agencies make decisions.
The implementation of Chevron affected not only the incentives to challengers and agencies, but also judges. Prior to Chevron, judges considered factors such as statute\interpretation contemporaneity and the longevity and consistency of the interpretation (Manning and Stephenson 2009 ). These rules left considerable room for judges to interject their own policy preferences in each ruling (Miles and Sunstein 2006) .
One potential draw of the Chevron rule is its potential to standardize how courts rule on administrative interpretations of statutes (Strauss 1987) . A clear standard for agency deference should reduce the amount judges can interject their own biases into rulings. Miles and Sunstein (2006) found strong evidence suggesting that judges rule according to their political leanings despite Chevron.
The ambiguity and selection effects surrounding the measure of legal change were first outlined by Priest and Kline (1984) . In their model of case selection they assume that cases with an obvious outcome to both parties will always settle for approximately the amount of the expected damages as long as both parties agree on the strength of the case. Drawing a distribution of cases according to the quality of the case, Priest and
Kline argue that the tails of the distribution will never reach litigation. 4 Thus, change in a legal standard represents a shift in the distribution of case quality. This shift, however,
will not be observed in the data because the legal change not only affects the standard, but also the distribution. If we assume a normal distribution of case quality, Figure 1 represents the Priest-Kline hypothesis. The dashed line at the mean represents the initial legal standard. The dotted lines represent the truncation of cases where the outcome is obvious to both parties. The area, A, represents the density of cases that are of high enough quality to litigate, but not high enough to win. B represents the cases that are strong enough to win but weak enough to still litigate (due to disagreement about case quality among the parties). The proportion of winning a case under the initial legal standard (assuming that being above the legal standard means winning) will be
(1)
Introducing a shift in legal standard will shift the dashed line as represented in Figure 2 .
The proportion of winning cases under the new regime would become 4 See Figure 1 (2) and the effect of the legal change is simply measured as change in the two proportions, or
In practice, this is impossible to measure because the distribution of case quality adjusts in response the shift in legal standard as is graphically displayed in Figure 3 . Also in Figure 3 , there is very little overlap between cases that were initially classified as strong enough to litigate but not strong enough to win (area A in Figures 1 and 2 ) and the range of cases considered strong enough to litigate but not strong enough to win under the new regime. The overlapping region is shaded in Figure 3 . The same is true for the upper end of the distribution. Essentially, the composition of case quality changes in such a way that voids an unbiased estimation of the effect of legal change.
Recently, Hubbard (2011) developed a formal model that allows for accurate measurement of legal change even amidst the presence of the shift of distribution of case quality, or selection effects. Hubbard argues that the correct measure of legal change, equation (3), can be measured if it were possible to change the legal standard (in the context of his paper, the standard for a motion to dismiss) without shifting the entire distribution of cases. He correctly points out that this is possible, at least in the short run, by looking at cases that were filed prior to the change in law (thus preserving the prior distribution of case quality) but terminated after the legal change. Essentially, Hubbard suggests that looking at cases "in the pipeline" allows the researcher to shift the legal standard while temporarily fixing the distribution of case quality. strategy employed in this paper is akin to the formal nested selection model outlined and estimated by Hubbard (2011) .
The data used in this analysis comes from Richards et al. (2006 That is, if a lower court judge tries to anticipate the change in legal standard, the distribution of case quality will shift before the change is actually made and any estimation would be biased. The Supreme Court, however, has no higher court to anticipate, so rulings are based more firmly on the beliefs of the Court at that time, rather than the estimated future beliefs of a higher court.
Additionally, even if it were the case that the ruling in Chevron was the culmination of a mutual sentiment among the Court, at worst the bias in this context would be a bias towards zero, suggesting that the true effect is actually larger than estimated. The estimation strategy, as discussed further below, is to measure the jump in agency deference that happened right after the passage of Chevron. If it were true that the Court decided prior to Chevron to start deferring to agency decisions like they did in
Chevron, that would mean that the period of time right prior to Chevron would display similar outcomes to the period right after Chevron and in the net, we would observe no difference, or at least a smaller than true difference, in the jump in agency deference. In the best case scenario, the estimates of Chevron's impact on agency deference is unbiased, and even in the worst case scenario, it is underestimated and the true value is in fact larger.
The discretionary docket inherent to the Supreme Court could provide, potentially, many avenues of bias spawning from the internal workings of the Court.
Nevertheless, by the Court's own admission, the purpose of the Court is not to correct errors, but rather rule on issues that transcend the facts and parties involved. 7 With the stated objective of the Court to rule on matters of more importance than just the facts at hand, it seems reasonable to assume that the Court did not grant cert. to cases surrounding the passage of Chevron with the sole purpose of affirming Chevron. It seems more likely that the Court chose to grant cert. to cases of major importance outside the direct realm of Chevron and ruled according to the Chevron two-step when applicable.
Lastly, the validity of this particular analysis is strengthened by the fact that the identification of Chevron's effect on agency deference comes off of cases that almost certainly already had cert. granted prior to the ruling in Chevron.
1.C Related Efforts to Estimate Chevron
Identifying the effect of Chevron has proven quite difficult. Previous studies have found both theoretically and empirically that Chevron favors agencies and their interpretation of statutes (Miles & Sustein 2006; Czarnezki 2009 
Estimation Strategies
Operating under the general framework of Hubbard (2011), identification comes from measuring the jump in the trend of deference that happened around the passage of
Chevron. In this case, there could be concern be that the Supreme Court decision might not be exogenously determined in the model. That is, the Supreme Court might be ruling based on the observed trend in agency deference. If this is the case, traditional estimation techniques would likely suffer from bias caused by endogeneity of the passing of
Chevron. Measuring the jump in the time trend, however, would not suffer from the same bias as long as date surrounding the uptake of Chevron is not precisely determined by some unobserved attitude, say in the Supreme Court.
A number of pending cases that were filed pre-Chevron and decided postChevron simulates a randomized trial. The strategy used in this analysis exploits the cases filed pre-Chevron 8 and decided post-, and compares them to cases that were filed pre-Chevron and decided right prior to Chevron. This estimation design allows me to place greatest weight on these cases decided right around Chevron and lesser weight out on the tails of the time distribution while still employing a sample size big enough for robust inference. What I hope to answer is what the world would be like if incentives to challenge agencies hadn't changed post-Chevron and everybody acted the same before and after.
2.A Parametric v. Nonparametric Model Specification
I employ two strategies to estimate any the trend in deference and any break surrounding the passage of Chevron. The first is to specify a flexible parametric model, and the second is to estimate the trend using nonparametric techniques. The choice between parametric and nonparametric specification is important if the underlying data follows a nonlinear trend as is the case with agency deference. To allow for function form flexibility, polynomials of varying order can be added to parametric specifications.
This approach has been criticized for allowing too much weight on the entire sample of data while not placing enough weight on the local data around the cut off point (Lee and Lemieux 2010) .
The alternative approach is to specify the trend using nonparametric regression techniques. Nadaraya (1964) and Watson (1964) outline the procedure which sorts the data into bins based on proximity of the variable containing the trend (in this context, time until/after the Chevron ruling) then calculates, in each bin, a smoothed local mean.
This allows the data to "speak for themselves" in such a way that is not bound by parametric specification. This idea has been extended by many, including Fan (1992) to specifying local polynomial regressions within each bin weighted by a kernel function.
Two potential shortfalls to nonparametric regression are that the results are often influence heavily by the choice of bandwidth (bin size) and that nonparametric regressions have poor boundary properties. There are available many options for kernel choice that improves the boundary performance of nonparametric regressions (Ludwig and Miller 2007) , and the issue of bandwidth choice is discussed in great detail later.
Since it is unclear, a priori, if the gains from one technique outweigh the costs of another, I report both results.
Model
To measure the jump in deference, I estimate:
where Yis is an indicator variable for whether justice i in time s voted in favor of agency deference, Ris is an indicator variable taking on the value 1 if the vote cast by justice i at time s was decided after Chevron was decided, Tis is a measure of the number of days between the vote i at time s and the ruling in Chevron, and  is random error. Tis is essentially a time trend centered around June 24 th , 1984-the day Chevron was decided.
The estimate of the impact of Chevron on agency deference is then the estimated value of. I identify    m both parametrically and nonparametrically.
3.A Parametric Specification
where polynomials of Tis are included until To provide the most flexibility in this parametric specification, the exercise of adding additionally higher order polynomials until insignificant is completed separately on each side of the cutoff, so equation (1) 
where T represented the day Chevron was decided and kL and kR represent the "optimal" polynomial order for the time trend leading into and out of Chevron, respectively. 10
3.B Nonparametric Specification
Nonparametic estimation differs from the flexible parametric design described above in the specification of the    m function. Perhaps the chief concern in nonparametric regression is the choice of bandwidth (Racine 2008) . While there are many methods to choose bandwidth selection, in the context of this analysis, bandwidth selection is quite straight forward. The "optimal" bandwidth is of a size that includes right around the cutoff of Chevron all the cases that were filed prior and ruled after. This ensures a proper comparison of all the cases that were filed prior and ruled after, to all the cases (in the same sized bandwidth) filed prior and ruled just prior to Chevron.
9
Throughout this paper, =.05
10
In the context of this paper, kL=kR, so both sides of the Chevron decision can be included in the same regression.
Essentially, I ensure that the estimation is correct by manually choosing a bin size that includes in the bin right after Chevron all the cases filed prior but ruled after. 
Data
The data used in this analysis was originally collected and coded by Richards et al. (2006) . They describe in detail how the data was collected. Essentially, they ran a legal search of all Supreme Court administrative law cases decided between 1969 and 2000 where there was a clear majority, oral argument, and Chevron was relevant.
1213
This excludes administrative cases to which Chevron does not directly apply. In addition, Richards et al. excluded tax and criminal cases, as they seem to represent a different aspect of agency adjudication. Additionally, they tested the validity of their case coding using random double-blind checks of coding accuracy and found the rate of agreement to be 80.3%.
The coded variable of whether or not a judge voted for deference is the dependent variable, and an indicator variable stating whether or not the case was decided postChevron is our independent variable of interest. As controls, the authors employed methods common in the Political Science literature to account for political ideology of the judge and of the 'liberalness' or 'conservativeness' of the agency ruling. In addition, controls were included to account for the number of amicus curiae briefs filed, the challenging party, advocating party, whether or not the president can fire the head of the agency, whether or not the case is a rulemaking case, and the length of the underlying statute.
11 Though this is the correct way, in this context, to choose bin size, other traditional methods for bin selection, including a large range of bins, do not alter the results. 12 Superior to this dataset would be one that contains appellate court rulings, at least in the DC Circuit. Unfortunately, this data is not currently available. 13 They describe in detail how they determine Chevron's relevance in each case.
5.
Results Table 2 replicates the results reported in Richards et al. (2006) . Column (1) replicates the logit coefficients. Column (2) reports the marginal effect of each logit coefficient in column (1), and column (3) Given the closeness of the LPM with the logit seen in Table 2 , and the ability to control for heteroskedasticity using robust standard errors, there is no reason to believe the LPM will bias the results. Table 3 reports the results of multiple parametric specifications of varying order polynomials. The "optimal" polynomial based on the criteria of equations 3.a and 3.b is a third order polynomial for both the pre-and the post-Chevron periods. Those results are reported in rows one and two of Table 3 with the estimated effect of 21 percentage points. Each even numbered row reports the results of the previous row including the controls outlined in Richards et al. to show the insensitivity of the results to the baseline covariates. In addition to the "optimal" order polynomial specification, Table 3 includes higher order polynomials as the parametric specification should be insensitive to higher order polynomials (Lee and Lemieux 2010) . 14 Table 3 reports this to generally be the case, though the magnitude increases quite a bit when we move from a 4 th to a 5 th order 14 In an alternative scheme to choose polynomial order, the "optimal" polynomial was chosen locally using only data contained in one bin pre-and post-Chevron, then repeated for two bins pre-and post-Chevron and so on. The idea was to find a good local fit to then apply globally. In general, the results of this exercise suggested a polynomial order someone between 3 and 6 which can be seen in Table 3 . These results are available upon request.
5.A Parametric Results
polynomial. The parametric specification suggests that the enactment of the Chevron doctrine increased agency deference by 21 percentage points. The parametric estimate of
Chevron's effect can also be seen in Figure 4 . The discontinuity surrounding Chevron can also be seen in Figure 4 .
To generate the scatter points in Figure 
5.B Nonparametric results
The results specifying m(Tis) nonparametrically are reported in Table 4 . At the bandwidth of 420, the nonparametric estimate of Chevron is about a 17 percentage point increase in the rate of deference. Standard errors of the jump are calculated using the calculations documented by McCrary (2008) . 1516 Previous research has found the choice of weighting scheme within each bin, or kernel, to not substantially affect the results though theoretically, the Triangle kernel is boundary optimal (Lee and Lemieux 2010, 15 McCrary (2008) uses the following formula to calculate the standard error of the discontinuity:
where n is the number of observations, h is the bandwidth size, Both specifications suggest an effect much larger than previously estimated. In fact, off of a mean of 62% deference, we would expect to see judges, under the Chevron two-step, defer to agency rulings around 80% of the time. The magnitude of the estimates presented here are double those presented by Shuck and Elliot (7.7 percentage points), and Richards et al. (8 percentage points) . A significant concern with measuring Chevron's effect is that selection effects outlined in Section 1 mask the true effect of this legal change, and the gain from this analysis is a more accurate measure of the magnitude of deference. Those selections effects are the likely cause for such a large disparity in estimates between the identification presented here and previous attempts. So while this analysis confirms the sign of the effect of Chevron with previous studies, it provides a much more accurate picture as to the magnitude of the effect.
Additional Considerations
One potential benefit of Chevron is its ability to steer judges away from deciding cases according to their personal policy preferences (Strauss 1987) . If this were in fact a problem, and Chevron fixed it, we should see an obvious trend in the pre-Chevron years and no discernible trend after. That is to say, there should be a distinct trend pre-Chevron and a measurable drop in agency deference. Table 5 reports the estimate of a break in the trend of judicial ideology. The estimated effect is only an increase of 1 percentage point, and it is statistically insignificant. Figure 6 displays the corresponding graph. This provides further evidence of the policy pushing framework proposed by Miles and Sunstein (2004) persists post-Chevron.
Conclusion
There are many likely reasons to believe that incentives play a role in the decision to challenge an agency ruling and that those incentives likely were altered with the passing of the Chevron two-step. This requires an estimator that corrects for the selection issues that occurred in the post-Chevron world. The identification in this analysis employs a large dataset of Supreme Court agency rulings to measure the jump in agency deference by exploiting the timing of cases filed with the Court. The jump in deference is measured using a flexible polynomial and non-parametric regressions.
The first, a polynomial parametric specification, suggests the Chevron effect to be a 21 percentage point increase in agency deference. The second technique is to specify the trend in agency deference nonparametrically. Nonparametric results suggest about a 17 percentage point increase in agency deference. This analysis confirms the sign of the effect of Chevron estimated by previous studies, but with an identification strategy that accounts for selection bias paints a more accurate picture of the magnitude of the effect.
Specifically, I estimate an effect that is at least twice as big as previous studies. The nonparametric results are quite robust to bandwidth specification, and the parametric results are robust to higher order polynomials.
8. Notes: Judge-Case clustered standard errors in parenthesis. The dependent variable is an indicator variable signaling whether or not a judge voted for agency deference. Each row represents a different regression including all polynomials of the order less than equal to the value specified in column 4. The even numbered rows represent each order polynomial specification repeated to include the controls used in Richards et al. (2006) . The "optimal" polynomial order is discussed in the Model section. ^ p<0.10 † p<0.05 ‡ p<0.001 
